We propose two alternatives to Xu's axiomatization of the Chellas STIT. The first one also provides an alternative axiomatization of the deliberative STIT. The second one starts from the idea that the historic necessity operator can be defined as an abbreviation of operators of agency, and can thus be eliminated from the logic of the Chellas STIT. The second axiomatization also allows us to establish that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a STIT formula without temporal operators is NP-complete in the single-agent case, and is NEXPTIME-complete in the multiagent case, both for the deliberative and the Chellas' STIT.
Introduction
STIT theory is one of the most prominent accounts of agency in philosophy of action. It is the logic of constructions of the form 'agent i sees to it that ϕ holds'. While STIT has played an important role in philosophical logic since the 80ies, it seems to be fair to say that its mathematical aspects have not been developed to the same extent. Most probably the reason is that STIT's models of agency are much more complex than those existing for other modal concepts (such as say necessity, belief, or knowledge): first, the 'seeing-to-it-that' modalities interact (or perhaps better: must be guaranteed not to interact) because the agents' choices are supposed to be independent; second there is another kind of modality involved, viz. the 'master modality' of historic necessity. There are also temporal modalities, but just as most of the other proof-theoretic approaches to STIT, we do not investigate these here.
As a consequence, proof systems for STIT are rather complex, too. To our knowledge the following have been proposed in the literature.
• Xu provides Hilbert-style axiomatizations in terms of the historic necessity operator and Chellas' STIT operator [BPX01, Chap. 17], without considering temporal operators. As the deliberative STIT-operator can be expressed in terms of Chellas' (together with the historic necessity operator), the axiomatization transfers to the deliberative STIT. Xu proves their completeness (without considering the temporal dimension), by means of canonical models, and proves decidability by means of filtration. Besides, Xu also gives a complete axiomatization of the one-agent achievement STIT [BPX01, Chap. 16].
• Wansing provides a tableau proof system for the deliberative STIT [Wan06]. The system is complete, but does not guarantee termination, and thus "is not tailored for defining tableau algorithms" [Wan06].
• Dégremont gives a dialogical proof procedure for the deliberative STIT [Dég06] . Again, the system is complete, but does not guarantee termination, and can therefore only be used to build proofs by hand.
In this note, we focus on the so-called Chellas STIT named after his proponent [Che69, Che92] . The original operator defined by Chellas is nevertheless notably different since it does not come with the principle of independence of agents that plays a central role here. Following its presentation in [HB95] , we use the term CSTIT to refer to the logic of that modal operator. We show that Xu's axiomatics of the logic of the Chellas STIT can be greatly simplified. After recalling it (Section 2) we propose an alternative one and prove its completeness (Section 3). Based on the latter we show that in presence of at least two agents, the modal operator of historic necessity can be defined as an abbreviation (Section 4). This leads to a simplified semantics (Section 5), and to characterizations of the complexity of satisfiability (Section 6).
2 Xu's axioms for the CSTIT Some preliminary remarks are due. In [BPX01, Chap. 17], Ming Xu presents Ldm, an axiomatization for the basic (that is, without temporal operators) deliberative STIT logic. As pointed out, deliberative STIT logic and Chellas' STIT logic are interdefinable and just differ in the choice of primitive operators. Following Xu we refer to these two logics as the deliberative STIT theories. We here mainly focus on Ldm with the Chellas STIT operator as primitive.
Language
The language of Chellas' STIT logic is built from a countably infinite set of atomic propositions ATM and a countable set of agents AGT . To simplify notation we suppose that AGT is an initial subset {0, 1, . . .} of N (possibly N itself).
Formulas are built by means of the boolean connectives together with modal operators of historic necessity and of agency in the standard way. Usually these modal constructions are noted Sett : ϕ ('ϕ is settled') and [i cstit : ϕ] ('i sees to it that ϕ'), where i ∈ AGT . For reasons of conciseness we here prefer to use ϕ instead of Sett : ϕ, and
CSTIT of the Chellas STIT is therefore defined by the following BNF:
where p ranges over ATM and i ranges over AGT . This provides a standard notation for the dual constructions ♦ϕ and i ϕ, respectively abbreviating ¬ ¬ϕ and
The language L AGT DSTIT of the deliberative STIT is defined by:
DSTIT contain temporal operators. The following function will be useful to compute the number of symbols that are necessary to write down ϕ. 
Semantics
The semantics of the CSTIT is extensively studied in Belnap et al. [BPX01] . It consists of a branching-time structure (BT) augmented by the set of agents and a choice function (AC). Here, we refer to BT + AC models as STIT-models.
A BT structure is of the form W, < , where W is a nonempty set of moments, and < is a tree-like ordering of these moments: for any w 1 , w 2 and w 3 in W , if w 1 < w 3 and w 2 < w 3 , then either w 1 = w 2 or w 1 < w 2 or w 2 < w 1 .
A maximal set of linearly ordered moments from W is a history. When w ∈ h we say that moment w is on the history h. Hist is the set of all histories. H w = {h|h ∈ Hist, w ∈ h} denotes the set of histories passing through w. An index is a pair w/h, consisting of a moment w and a history h from H w (i.e., a history and a moment in that history).
A BT+AC model is a tuple M = W, <, Choice, V , where:
• W, < is a BT structure;
Hist is a function mapping each agent and each moment w into a partition of H w , such that 
The equivalence classes belonging to Choice w i can be thought of as possible choices that are available to agent i at w. Given a history h ∈ H w , Choice w i (h) represents the particular choice from Choice w i containing h, or in other words, the particular action performed by i at the index w/h. We call the constraint of nonempty intersection of all possible simultaneous choices of agents (or: strategy profile) the superadditivity constraint.
A formula is evaluated with respect to a model and an index.
Hence historical necessity (or inevitability) at a moment w in a history is truth in all histories passing through w. According to Chellas, an agent i sees to it that ϕ in a moment-history pair w/h if ϕ holds on all histories that agree with i's current choice.
Validity in BT+AC structures is defined as truth at every moment-history pairs of every BT+AC-models. A formula ϕ is satisfiable in BT+AC structures if ¬ϕ is not valid in BT+AC structures.
The following valid equivalences justify the interdefinability of our STIToperators:
Axiomatics
Xu gave the following axiomatics of Chellas' CSTIT:
S5( ) the axiom schemas of S5 for S5(i) the axiom schemas of S5 for every [i]
The last item is a family of axiom schemes for independence of agents that is parameterized by the integer k. Remark. As (AIA k+1 ) implies (AIA k ), the family of schemas can be replaced by the single (AIA Card (AGT )−1 ) when AGT is finite.
Xu's system has the standard inference rules of modus ponens and necessitation for . From the latter necessitation rules for every [i] follow by axiom ( →i).
Theorem 1 ([BPX01, Chapter 17]). A formula ϕ of L AGT

CSTIT is valid in BT+AC structures iff ϕ is provable from the schemas S5( ), S5(i), ( →i), and (AIA k ) by the rules of modus ponens and -necessitation.
Xu's decidability proof proceeds by building a canonical model followed by filtration [BPX01, Theorems 17-18]. Although he does not mention complexity issues, when decidability is proved by canonical model construction from which a finite model is obtained by filtration, then "a NEXPTIME algorithm is usually being employed" [BdRV01, Appendix C, p. 515]. Therefore it can be expected that the problem of deciding the satisfiability of a given formula of L AGT CSTIT is in NEXPTIME. We shall characterize complexity precisely in Section 6.
They are defined from an equality predicate = whose domain is AGT . Formally we have to add the axioms: diff (i 0 ) ↔ ⊤, and
In consequence Xu's axiomatics has to contain axioms for equality. We here preferred not to introduce equality in order to stay with the same logical language throughout.
Clearly, each of our (AIA k ) can be proved from Xu's original (AIA k ). The other way round, given k and
by appropriately choosing ϕn to be ⊤ for all those n < i k that are not among i 0 , . . . , i k : as [n]ϕn ↔ ⊤ and ♦[n]ϕn ↔ ⊤ hold, these conjuncts can be dropped from our (AIA i k ).
An alternative axiomatics
We now prove that (AIA k ) can be replaced by the family of axiom schemes
We call (AAIA k ) the alternative axiom schema for independence of agents. Just as Xu's (AIA k ), (AAIA k ) involves k + 1 agents.
Proof. See Annex.
To warm up, we first prove that our (AAIA 1 ) implies Xu's (AIA 1 ).
Lemma 2. The schema (AIA 1 ) is provable from S5( ), S5(i), ( →i) and:
by modus ponens and -necessitation.
Proof. We establish the following deduction:
from previous line by -necessitation and K( )
from previous line by ( →i) axiom and S5( )
We turn back to an arbitrary number of agents.
Lemma 3. Every schema (AIA k ) is provable from S5( ), S5(i), ( →i) and (AAIA k ) by the rules of modus ponens and -necessitation.
Proof. We proceed by induction on k. The base case k = 1 is settled by Lemma 2. Now, suppose AIA k−1 is provable:
We prove AIA k with the following steps.
CSTIT is valid in BT+AC structures iff it is provable from the axiom schemas S5( ), S5(i), ( →i) and (AAIA k ) by the rules modus ponens and -necessitation.
Proof. First, observe that Xu's axiomatics and ours only differ by the schemas (AIA k ) and (AAIA k ).
Soundness follows from:
1. the validity of our schemas AAIA k (see Lemma 1), 2. the validity of the rest of the axioms, and 3. the fact that modus ponens and -necessitation preserve validity.
The last two points are warranted by the soundness of Xu's axioms (Theorem 1).
Completeness follows from provability of Xu's (AIA k ) from our (AAIA k ) (see Lemma 3). As observed above, the rest of Xu's axioms is directly present in our axiomatics. 4 Historic necessity is superfluous in presence of two agents or more
In this section, we suppose that Card (AGT ) ≥ 2, i.e. there are at least agents 0 and 1. The equivalence ♦ϕ ↔ 1 0 ϕ is provable from (AAIA 1 ), ( →i) and S5( ). This suggests that ϕ can be viewed as an abbreviation of [1][0]ϕ. Let us take this as an axiom schema.
Pushing this further we can prove that under Def( ), axiom (AAIA k ) can be replaced by the family of axiom schemas of general permutation:
Note that similar to Xu's axiomatization, if AGT is finite then the single schema (GPerm Card(AGT )−1 ) is sufficient. The next lemma establishes soundness.
Lemma 4. (GPerm k ) is valid in BT+AC structures.
Now we prove that the principles of the preceding section can be derived. Proof. First let us prove that the logic of is S5. Clearly the K-axiom (ϕ → ψ) → ( ϕ → ψ) is provable using standard modal principles, and the T-axiom ϕ → ϕ follows from S5(0) and S5(1). It remains to prove the 5-axiom ♦ϕ → ♦ϕ: Finally, -necessitation is derivable by applying first 0-necessitation and then 1-necessitation. Concerning (AAIA k ) it is easy to see that under Def( ) it is an instance of (GPerm k ), for all k ≥ 1. It remains to prove ( → i). Let us show that i ϕ → 1 0 ϕ: (2) and (GPerm 1 ). Therefore STIT logic with two agents is a so-called product logic, alias a twodimensional modal logic [Mar99, GKWZ03] . Such product logics are characterized by the permutation axiom 0 1 ϕ ↔ 1 0 ϕ together with the ChurchRosser axiom. Hence the logic of the two-agent STIT is nothing but the product S5 2 = S5⊗S5.
A simpler semantics
All axiom schemes are in the Sahlqvist class [BdRV01] , and therefore have a standard possible worlds semantics. Kripke models are of the form M = W, R, V , where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, R is a mapping associating to every i ∈ AGT an equivalence relation R i on W , and V is a mapping from ATM to the set of subsets of W . We impose that R satisfies the following property:
Definition 2 (general permutation property). We say that R satisfies the general permutation property iff for all w, v ∈ W and for all l, m, n ∈ AGT , if w, v ∈ R l • R m then there is u ∈ W such that: w, u ∈ R n and u, v ∈ R i for every i ∈ AGT \ {n}.
We have the usual truth condition:
and the usual definitions of validity and satisfiability.
Lemma 6. For every M = W, R, V , and every i, j ∈ AGT , R satisfies the following properties:
R i • R j is an equivalence relation for every
Proof.
(1) follows from the validity of i j ϕ → 1 0 ϕ (due to (GPerm 0 )), and the validity of 1 0 ϕ → i j ϕ (due to (GPerm j ), given that i = j).
(2) follows from (1) and the fact that the S5-axioms are valid for (see Lemma 5).
In (3), the right-to-left inclusion
* . For the left-to-right inclusion suppose w, v ∈ ( i∈AGT R i ) * . Hence there are i 0 , . . . , i k such that w, v ∈ R i0 • . . . • R i k . As all the R i l are equivalence relations we may suppose w.l.o.g. that i l = i l+1 .
k/2 by (1). The latter is equal to R 0 • R 1 by (2). (1) and (2). The latter is equal to R 0 • R 1 • R 0 again by (1), and to R 0 • R 0 • R 1 by (2), which is equal to R 0 • R 1 because R 0 is an equivalence relation.
It follows that ( i∈AGT
R i ) * ⊆ R 0 • R 1 . Theorem 4. A formula of L AGT
CSTIT is valid in Kripke models satisfying the general permutation property iff it is provable from S5(i) the axiom schemas of S5 for every [i]
Def( )
by the rules of modus ponens and [i]-necessitation.
Proof. If AGT is finite then Sahlqvist's Theorem warrants that our axiomatics of Section 4 is sound and complete w.r.t. Kripke models satisfying the general permutation property. We show in the annex that this can be extended to the infinite case.
Complexity
The axiom system of the preceding section allows us to characterize the complexity of satisfiability of STIT formulas. We study separately the cases of Chellas' STIT and of the deliberative STIT.
Complexity of Chellas' STIT
First, satisfiability of CSTIT-formulas can be decided in nondeterministic exponential time.
Lemma 7. The problem of deciding satisfiability of a formula of L
AGT
CSTIT is in NEXPTIME.
Proof. This can be proved by the standard filtration construction, which establishes that in order to know whether a formula ϕ is satisfiable in the Kripke models of Section 5 it suffices to consider models having at most 2 ||ϕ|| possible worlds. See the annex for details.
In the rest of the section we show that the upper bound is tight if there are at least two agents. As usual we start with the two-agents case.
Lemma 8. If Card (AGT ) = 2 then the problem of deciding satisfiability of a formula of L AGT
CSTIT is NEXPTIME-hard. Proof. Remember our observation at the end of Section 4: when Card (AGT ) = 2 then CSTIT AGT is nothing but the product logic S5⊗S5. We can then apply a result of Marx in [Mar99], who proved that the problem of deciding membership of ϕ in S5⊗S5 is NEXPTIME-hard. (Actually Marx also proved membership in NEXPTIME.)
Hence two-agent CSTIT logic is NEXPTIME-complete. Now we state NEXPTIMEcompleteness for any number of agents greater than 2. Proof. This can be proved by establishing an upper bound on the size of the models that is quadratic in the length of the formula under concern.
Remark. Intriguingly, while one-agent STIT has the same complexity as S5, and two-agent STIT has the same complexity as S5 2 , 3-agent STIT does not have the same complexity as S5 3 : while Xu's proof establishes decidability of L AGT CSTIT -formulas for any number of agents, it was proved by Maddux that S5 Thus we have characterized the complexity of satisfiability of CSTIT formulas for all cases.
Complexity of the deliberative STIT
The complexity results for Chellas' STIT do not immediately transfer to DSTIT. Indeed, the definition of the deliberative STIT from the CSTIT through [i dstit : ϕ] = [i]ϕ] ∧ ¬ ϕ does not directly provide a lower bound for the deliberative STIT because this is not a polynomial transformation. We now establish these results by giving polynomial translations from CSTIT to DSTITand vice versa.
Let ϕ 0 be any formula of L AGT DSTIT , and let sf (ϕ 0 ) be the set of subformulas of ϕ 0 . Let {p ψ : ψ ∈ sf (ϕ 0 )} be a set of (pairwise distinct) atoms none of which occurs in ϕ 0 . Every p ψ abbreviates the subformula ψ of ϕ 0 . We recursively define equivalences ('biimplications') that capture the logical relation between p ψ and ψ.
Definition 3. We define:
Definition 4. We define the translation tr from DSTIT formulas to CSTIT formulas as: It follows that the problem of deciding whether a formula of L AGT DSTIT is satisfiable is in NEXPTIME. We now prove that this bound is tight.
Definition 5. We define equivalences
B ′ ϕ such that B ′ [i]ϕ = (p [i]ϕ ↔ [i dstit : p ϕ ] ∨ p ϕ ) and B ′ ϕ = B ϕ if ϕ
is an atomic formula or if its main logical connector is boolean.
Definition 6. We define the translation tr
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 7.
Together, Theorems 5, 6, 7 and 8 entail: 
Conclusion
In this note we have established NEXPTIME-completeness of the satisfiability problem of formulas of Chellas' STIT and of the deliberative STIT for the case of two or more agents. All our complexity results appear to be new.
Our new axiom system for STIT of Section 3 is an interesting alternative to Xu's. It highlights the central role of the well-known equivalences [i] [j]ϕ ↔ ϕ and [i dstit : [j dstit : ϕ]] ↔ ⊥, for i = j in theories of agency: as we have shown, they allow to capture independence of agents just as Xu's schema (AIA k ) does.
For the case of more than two agents, Section 4 provides a quite simple axiom system that is made up of very basic modal principles, and moreover, does without historic necessity.
As we have pointed out in Section 3, an alternative axiomatics for the deliberative STIT follows straightforwardly. We do not know whether the redundancy of historic necessity that we have established for the CSTIT in Section 4 transfers to the deliberative STIT.
[ In order to prove the validity of every schema
in BT+AC structures, we show that for every w ∈ W , h, h ′ ∈ H w and k ∈ AGT there is h k ∈ Choice 
A.2: Proof of Lemma 4
We have to prove the validity of every schema
A look at the proof of Lemma 1 shows that ♦ϕ → n i≤k,i =n i ϕ is valid in BT+AC structures. It therefore suffices to show the validity of l m ϕ → ♦ϕ. The latter is the case because (1) l m ϕ → ♦♦ϕ is valid (due to validity of axiom ( →i)), and (2) ♦♦ϕ → ♦ϕ is valid (due to validity of S5( )).
A.3: Proof of Theorem 4
We prove the theorem for the infinite case, i.e. Card (AGT ) = N. In this case the general permutation property is no longer a first-order property, and Sahlqvist's result does not apply, i.e. the canonical model does not necessarily satisfy the general permutation property.
Let ϕ be a formula that is consistent w.r.t. the axiomatic system of Section 4. Let M = W, R, V be the canonical model associated to this system. By arguments following the lines of those in the proof of Lemma 6 we have:
• ∀i ∈ AGT , R i is an equivalence relation;
By the truth lemma we may suppose that M is generated via R 1 • R 0 from a possible world w ∈ W such that M, w |= ϕ.
for all i ∈ AGT not occurring in ϕ. This allows us to show that M ′ satisfies the general permutation property. From this completeness follows (via the filtration lemma).
A.4: Proof of Lemma 7
Let M = W, R, V be a Kripke model such that every R i is an equivalence relation and R satisfies the general permutation property. Let u be a world and ϕ a formula of L Hence, ∀ϕ ∈ L AGT CSTIT , if ϕ is satisfiable then ∃M = W, R, V such that Card (W ) ≤ 2 ||ϕ|| and there is w ∈ W such that M, w |= ϕ. It allows us to propose a decision procedure with input ϕ ∈ L AGT CSTIT , and which works as follows: guess an integer N ≤ 2 ||ϕ|| and a model M = W, R, V such that Card (W ) ≤ N ; then check whether there is a w ∈ W such that M, w |= ϕ.
A.5: Proof of Theorem 5
The upper bound is given by Lemma 7.
To establish the lower bound consider the set of formulas where only the agent symbols 0 and 1 occur. We show that deciding satisfiability of any formula of that fragment is NEXPTIME-hard, for any AGT such that Card (AGT ) ≥ 2. If AGT is just {0, 1} this holds by Lemma 8. Else we prove that if {0, 1} ⊂ AGT then the logic of Kripke models for AGT is a conservative extension of that for {0, 1}.
Let ϕ be any formula containing only 0 and 1.
For the left-to-right direction, suppose ϕ is valid in all Kripke models for the set of agents {0, 1}. By Theorem 3, ϕ can then be proved from axioms (GPerm 1 ), (Perm01), S5(0) and S5(1) with the rules of modus ponens, [0]-and [1]-necessitation. Therefore ϕ is also provable from the 'bigger' axiomatics for AGT .
For the right-to-left direction, suppose there is a Kripke model M = W, R, V for the set of agents {0, 1} and a w ∈ W such that M, w |= ϕ, where R : {0, 1} −→ P(W × W ) associates to every i ∈ {0, 1} an equivalence relation R i on W . We are going to build a Kripke model M ′ for the bigger set of agents AGT such that M ′ , w |= ϕ. Let M ′ = W, R ′ , V such that R ′ : AGT −→ P(W × W ) with R (The identities in all these items hold because R 0 and R 1 permute by item 1 of Lemma 6, and because R 0 and R 1 are equivalence relations.) Thus w, v ∈ R ′ l • R ′ m implies w, v ∈ R 0 • R 1 . We have to show that for every n ≥ 1 there is u n ∈ W such that: w, u n ∈ R ′ n and u n , v ∈ R ′ i , for every i ∈ AGT .
• For n = 1, w, v ∈ R 0 • R 1 implies that w, v ∈ R 1 • R 0 by item 1 of Lemma 6, and the latter implies that w, v ∈ R 
A.5: Proof of Theorem 7
The proof is done via the following lemmata.
Lemma 9. For all formulas ϕ 0 in the language of DSTIT, if ϕ 0 is satisfiable then tr(ϕ 0 ) is satisfiable.
